

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-10-2006		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Realizing the 1000-Ship Navy		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) CDR Dan Uhls, USNR-FTS Paper Advisor (if Any): Prof Pat Sweeny, CDR Dave Davis		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT While addressing the August 2005 Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen unveiled what many consider the cornerstone of the United States Navy's new maritime strategy, the formation of a global fleet, or a 1000-Ship Navy. Admiral Mullen did not use this euphemism to describe a thousand ships directly doing our Republic's bidding, but rather a global maritime security arrangement, designed to synergize the collective maritime capabilities of our allies to further security in the maritime domain. Admiral Mullen's initiative was born partly out of the globalization driven need ensure free, and unfettered access to the global commons by legitimate merchant traffic, and the realities of an ever shrinking American fleet's inability to conduct global sea-control unilaterally. This paper highlights the genesis of the global fleet initiative, its requirements, and likely roles in international security. It explains the current nature of coalition building and provides a recommended departure from current paradigms required to realize the global fleet.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS 1000-Ship Navy, Maritime Domain Awareness, Global Fleet Initiative.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 27	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

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REALIZING THE 1000-SHIP NAVY

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

23 October, 2006

Abstract

While addressing the August 2005 Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen unveiled what many consider the cornerstone of the United States Navy's new maritime strategy, the formation of a global fleet, or a 1000-Ship Navy. Admiral Mullen did not use this euphemism to describe a thousand ships directly doing our Republic's bidding, but rather a global maritime security arrangement, designed to synergize the collective maritime capabilities of our allies to further security in the maritime domain. Admiral Mullen's initiative was born partly out of the globalization driven need ensure free, and unfettered access to the global commons by legitimate merchant traffic, and the realities of an ever shrinking American fleet's inability to conduct global sea-control unilaterally. This paper highlights the genesis of the global fleet initiative, its requirements, and likely roles in international security. It explains the current nature of coalition building and provides a recommended departure from current paradigms required to realize the global fleet.

Where the old Maritime Strategy focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises – not when the seas are controlled by one – but rather when they are made safe and free for all. Today, the globalization of the world economy is truly an engine of hope for our children and for all people.ⁱ

Admiral Mike Mullen

Why do we need a 1000-Ship Navy?

Any study of the global fleet must begin with answering the question: why do we need a 1000-Ship Navy? The answer appears, unfortunately, to be sheer necessity. At the end of the Cold War, and the demise of our only military competitor, our political leadership envisioned both a peace dividend and the continuance of *Pax Americana*. Neither has been fully realized. For the Navy, the onset of American Military hegemony did precipitate a dramatic reduction in force structure, without a commensurate reduction in operational requirements. The fleet's operational tempo actually increased by 60 percent during the 1990s.ⁱⁱ The post Cold War increase in intra-state conflicts, regional crises, combined with a more interventionist attitude of the world community, and our own nation in particular, placed considerable strain on the fleet.

For the first decade post Cold War, the operational friction points for our service largely resulted from our own political will. However, the introspective study in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks provided insight on an unavoidable truth of 21st century geo-politics; the realities of globalization. The notion of total national security proved to be a myth. Total security and total defense in the age of globalization were not attainable. The real issue was how much security risk America was willing to assume. The unfortunate truth was that globalization had eroded our long cherished position as an insular, almost island nation, and the protection provided by the vast distances of our maritime borders. The ability to simply retreat into isolation behind our sea frontiers was forever gone.

The post September 2001 realization of the effects of globalization forced our nation and our allies to acknowledge the interconnection of our respective security environments. No longer could a threat to the nation be defined simply in terms of territorial integrity. America was forced to consider local security as a global endeavor.ⁱⁱⁱ

No place was this clearer than the realization of the interrelation of the global economies. Our economy is by far the world's largest,^{iv} but it is by no means isolatable from any of the other major economies. Our own economy, and thus our way of life, is wholly dependent upon international trade. The maintenance of international trade is thus a vital national interest.^v The Navy's key contribution to protecting this vital national interest precipitates from the fact that international trade is a largely maritime venture. Merchant vessels transiting the high seas move approximately 80 percent of our international trade.^{vi} Thus, controlling the world's oceans, keeping them free for unfettered, lawful, commerce, is the primary peacetime focus of the USN.

Without mastery of the sea -- without Sea Power -- we cannot protect trade, we cannot help those in peril, we cannot provide relief from natural disaster, and we cannot intercede when whole societies are torn asunder by slavery, weapons of mass destruction, drugs, and piracy. Without sea power, we cannot hope -- the world cannot hope -- to achieve what President Bush has called 'a balance of power that favors freedom.'^{vii}

Admiral Mike Mullen

Sea control for the purposes of controlling international trade has been the undertaking of seamen for centuries, but the realities of mission have changed considerably since Sir Julian Corbett wrote about them in *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.^{viii}

Globalization dictates that maritime nations can any longer simply focus their attention on the water-space immediately surrounding their ports, or along their trade routes.

Globalization means that in order to properly execute sea control it has to be conducted on a global scale. From the South China Sea, to the Baltic, to the great southern ocean, the United

States and our allies have established that the free-flow of maritime commerce as vital to their national economies. The general roles of the Navy have not changed dramatically because of globalization. What has changed is the capacity of the USN to conduct them all successfully. While the fleet of the 21st century is, individually, far more capable than its successors, it is nonetheless a shrinking fleet. During the last American attempt at near global sea control, the Second World War, the fleet counted greater than 6700 ships in its ranks,^{ix} today just 281.^x With stagnant ship building budgets, dramatically increasing per unit construction cost, and almost sixty percent of the nation favoring further reductions in the fleet,^{xi} the Navy is unlikely to see significant expansion. Simply stated, policing the world's ocean commons requires substantially more capacity than the USN possesses. As a result, naval leadership increasingly sees multinational naval cooperation as the only realistic means of securing the high seas. Thus, Admiral Mullen called for global naval cooperation in the form of the 1000-Ship Navy.

I've engaged with heads of navies from around the world, upwards of 72 different countries, in the concept that I call a 1,000 ship navy. It's a thousand ships of like-minded nations working together to get at the emerging challenges of weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, drugs, weapons, pirates, human trafficking and immigration. These are challenges we all have, and we need to work together to ensure that the sea-lanes are secure.^{xii}

Admiral Mike Mullen

What is the mission for the 1000-Ship Navy?

As naval leadership strives to realize the 1000-Ship Navy, they must ask themselves the basic question; what is the mission of the 1000-Ship Navy? The 1000-Ship Navy will face challenges past coalitions stood immune to. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's notions of the nature and roles of sea power seem somewhat out-dated in the post Cold War world: the ideas of Sir Julian Corbett seem more germane.^{xiii} Today, only the USN can unilaterally influence major global maritime security issues. The United Kingdom, China, France, India,

and Russia each possess navies individually capable of influencing minor or regional issues, but none are of truly global reach. As each of these nations resides firmly within Thomas Barnett's functioning core,^{xiv} and have equal stakes in maintaining the free flow of international commerce, it seems, contrary to Mahan, exceedingly unlikely that the world's great navies will be called upon to conduct decisive naval engagements.

While a conventional-war threat from nation-states cannot be totally disregarded, the more likely challenge to our, and our allies, maritime interests will originate from a variety of non-state actors. It appears certain that the envisioned 1000-Ship Navy will be deeply involved in combating transnational maritime crime, essentially bringing the rule of law to the ocean's global commons. Transnational maritime crime includes international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and economically motivated crime such as piracy, smuggling, and illegal migration. Transnational maritime crime has substantial security ramifications, especially economic ramifications, for both ourselves, and our global partners.

With the change of mission area between the traditional naval warfare and an emphasis on combating transnational maritime crime, comes a commensurate change in operational requirements. In the Mahanian notion of naval warfare, mobility and firepower to engage in decisive battle against an enemy fleet are cherished above all characteristics, and are the foundation of the USN's still prevalent Battle-Ship mentality.^{xv} In the operational arena of the 1000-Ship Navy planners will still cherish those characteristics, but they will be usurped by the ability to establish and maintain Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The key to combating today's transnational maritime threats appears clear: an effective

understanding of all activities, events, and trends on the world's oceans. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* captures this essence by saying:

Awareness and threat knowledge are critical for securing the maritime domain and the key to preventing adverse events..... Such knowledge is essential to supporting decision-making for planning, identifying requirements, prioritizing resource allocation, and implementing maritime security operations. Domain awareness enables the early identification of potential threats and enhances appropriate responses, including interdiction at an optimal distance with capable prevention forces.^{xvi}

For the 1000-Ship Navy, achieving global MDA will be challenging. The sheer vastness of the oceans, the great expanse of the littorals, and the myriad of available port areas add considerably complexity to the task. Near universal use of flags of convenience,^{xvii} lack of transparency into a vessel's ownership, crew, and cargo offer additional opportunities and challenges for the 1000-Ship Navy. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimates that there are 92,000 ships of greater than 100 tons roaming the world's oceans^{xviii}, flying the flags of 150 nations.^{xix} MDA requires integrating all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and open-source data from the public and private sectors to maintain visibility on these 92,000 ships. It is heavily dependent on information sharing and requires unprecedented cooperation among the various elements of the public and private sectors, both nationally and internationally.

To establish a global MDA, the 1000-Ship Navy will not only have to rely on the world's grey-hulled fleets, but its Coast Guards, border control mechanisms, and civilian maritime organizations. Most of the threats that the 1000-Ship Navy will confront will not be bearing a nation's colors, they will likely be criminal in nature. As such, traditional military forces may not be able to counter effectively these threats as they commingle with and strive to become indistinguishable from legitimate commerce. Law enforcement authorities acting

within their sovereign authority may, at times, best respond to these threats. Even in our own domestic context, the USCG and the US Customs and Border Patrol Service may be appropriate as they are not constrained by the *Posse Comitatus Act of 1878*.^{xx} A clear example where the cooperation with a nation's domestic maritime organizations may actually be more critical than that of its military is Panama. Up to 14,000 transoceanic vessels transit the Panama Canal each year, carrying approximately 5% of the world trade under the auspices of the autonomous Autoridad Canal De Panama (ACP).^{xxi} The inclusion of the ACP is thus critical to establishing localized MDA, while the inclusion of the ineffectual Servicio Marítimo Nacional^{xxii} may not be. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* accurately captures this thought by saying “Maritime security is best achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into a comprehensive, integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats.”^{xxiii}

America, in this new century, again faces new threats. Instead of massed armies, we face stateless networks; we face killers who hide in our own cities. We must confront deadly technologies. To inflict great harm on our country, America's enemies need to be only right once. Our intelligence and law enforcement professionals in our government must be right every single time.^{xxiv}

President George W. Bush

Alternatives futures for the 1000-Ship Navy:

To realize the 1000-Ship Navy the service has two logical paths to pursue. The first being the establishment of an actual coalition of navies operating under a combined, or coordinated command and control structure. *Joint Publication 3-16 (Joint Publication for Multi-National Operations)* defines a coalition as “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common acts.”^{xxv} This, historically, has been the path maritime nations have followed during times of war and crisis. These coalitions are reactive in nature, and formed to combat a perceived common threat to national security. They are generally of limited scope, in both duration, and mission, and scale, often limited to a restricted operational area.

The USN is currently involved in such a multi-national coalition, Task Force 150, in the Arabian Sea.

The second logical path is to form a coalition of the navies' individual command structures, operating independently, but in concert. These coalitions are loosely organized around parallel, but not necessarily common, national security interest. They are generally of longer duration, larger scope, and could more aptly be characterized as naval cooperation, vice naval coalition. The USN is currently involved in this type of coalition in the Caribbean, where the navies of France, The United Kingdom, Colombia, and The Netherlands routinely operate individually to protect their sovereign interest, but in concert with the USN. In this form of coalition, there is no common command and control structure, only a loose agreement to coordinate efforts.^{xxvi}

The 1000-Ship Navy – a naval coalition:

As previously outlined, one option for realizing the 1000-Ship Navy is to form a coalition of willing nations and their navies to pursue a common goal. The coalition navies would work under some form of common command and control system, synergizing their efforts, to effect the completion of a common mission. While this option is preferred by most, and possibly the most effective option, it seems unrealistic. It is the very nature of the enemy, the current status of geo-politics, and the scope and scale of the mission that make this option, while certainly attractive, unfeasible.

The formation of multinational naval coalitions is not a new concept. Coalitions have assembled in times of war as long as alliances among maritime nations have existed. In peacetime, however, apart from exercises among allies, navies generally operate unilaterally to protect their nation's sovereign interest.^{xxvii} There are two alternative mechanisms for

forming a multi-national coalition into the 1000-Ship Navy. Each have their respective pros and cons; but both are equally implausible.

The first would be the formation of a 1000-Ship coalition operating under a unified command and control architecture. This C2 lash up would be either American led, or American dominated (NATO), and ideally would function without United Nations oversight. With our current primacy-leaning foreign policy this would be our preferred methodology of our government and the Navy, but does not appear realistic. For the US, this form of coalition-building approach to global security is based on the premise that our prospective allies share the same foreign policy interests as the US, and have parallel national security interests, that would be best served by participation in the coalition. However, there is a problem of perception in this. Many of our allies, while supportive of maritime security, are concerned that our Republic views other nation's concerns as subordinate to our own.^{xxviii} Suggestions of coalition forming under USN leadership would lead to the assertion that participation in the 1000-Ship Navy would compromise their sovereignty, particularly in view of the necessary inclusion of internal border control mechanisms and domestic maritime organizations into the coalition to establish a global MDA. Sovereignty sensitivities are currently especially high due to the widening gap between American foreign policy and that of our allies. Internationally, with the possible exception of Australia and the United Kingdom, even cooperative ventures that do not directly undermine sovereignty such as joint exercises or voluntary information sharing are viewed with caution lest they lead to creeping infringement of the US government on their national interest. Without a clear and enforceable United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, it is doubtful that many of our allies have the stomach for participation in American military adventures, especially in

light of the war in Iraq. For a clear example of localized sovereignty sensitivities prohibiting even a low scale maritime coalition you need look no further than Indonesia and Malaysia's rejection of COMPACFLT's Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).^{xxix} Both nations have resoundingly rejected RMSI, US assistance conducting anti-piracy patrols in the Strait of Malacca, due to a fear of American unilateral action if operating in the area.^{xxx} PACOM views the initiative as international cooperation,^{xxxi} while the regional sovereigns view it as US intrusion.

The second option, forming a coalition with UNSC mandate, and under UN C2, would be much more palatable for most of our allies as it mitigates most concerns about US infringements on sovereignty. But, like the US dominated option, it does not appear to be plausible. The first, and potentially insurmountable, obstacle is that before a mandate aimed at establishing the 1000-Ship Navy can be hammered out, there must be true consensus among the five permanent members of the UNSC. In consideration of the often-competing national interest of the other permanent members, it appears unlikely that an agreement could be reached without a catastrophic maritime event to serve as a catalyst. The chances of successfully organizing the 1000-Ship Navy under the UN banner depends ultimately on the degree to which UN member states are willing to cede control of their national navies to the international body. Even if the UNSC could reach a mandate, it is unlikely that the US would fully participate. It appears that the reservations delineated in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which said "The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces."^{xxxii} would prove germane.

While both options for realizing the 1000-Ship Navy through a traditional coalition have their inherent difficulties in executing, they are not without their merits. If formed, and sustained they are a very effective way to conduct business. Unified command usually produces unified effort.^{xxxiii} However, without a catastrophic maritime event to serve as a catalyst, it is unlikely that the realities of geo-politics will allow coalition formation of the scope and scale envisioned for the 1000- Ship Navy.

In this century, countries benefit from healthy, prosperous, confident partners. Weak and troubled nations export their ills –problems like economic instability and illegal immigration and crime and terrorism. America and others understand that healthy and prosperous nations export and import goods and services that help stabilize regions and add security to every nation.^{xxxiv}

President George W. Bush

The 1000-Ship Navy – maritime cooperation:

With the formation of a binding coalition of the size and scope necessary to attain global maritime security implausible, it seems that the only logical means of realizing the 1000-Ship Navy is by synergizing the unitary efforts of our allies. The concept of a large multi-national naval force operating in concert on the high seas needs to be replaced with one of the many navies of the world conducting operations, often unilateral, in a cooperative manner. Multinational naval cooperation is not a new phenomenon; it has been routine procedure among navies for many centuries. What has changed recently are the political, technical, and operational factors that influence the way naval forces work together. This has been especially true in the post Cold War era. While maritime cooperation in this manner appears plausible, forming such a coalition is not without its challenges.

The basic premise of maritime cooperation in this format is that each participating nation will utilize the full scope of its resources (military, Coast Guard, port authorities, etc) and its sovereign rights as established under the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to establish localized sea-control within its EEZ.^{xxxv} Each nation would then share the resultant MDA with the other participating nations. UNCLOS provides the impetus for the 1000-Ship Navy in that it provides each nation with the obligation of exercising some degree of sovereignty over its EEZ.^{xxxvi} UNCLOS applied the land-based concept of sovereignty to the maritime domain, and made exercising those rights within the EEZ an important national responsibility.^{xxxvii} This exercise of sovereignty in support of the global fleet will take the form of the establishment and maintenance of a common, shared, logically cyber-based MDA of its EEZ. This form of cyber-based MDA sharing is not without precedence, already existing in the Western Mediterranean. The Italian led Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Center's aim is improving the exchange of information about merchant traffic transiting, inbound, and outbound in the wider Mediterranean.^{xxxviii} The cooperative, cyber-based MDA would be the keystone of the global fleet under this premise.

The strength of the concept of cooperation lies in the flexibility of its implementation, in the fact that all nations are called to deal with a series of common threats, cooperatively, while exercising their own sovereign rights. The establishment of an EEZ-wide MDA is well within the maritime nation's sovereign rights under UNCLOS, and should be immune to flag state sensitivities. Maritime state leaders virtually everywhere are concerned about the non-military, maritime threats they confront, but they are unwilling to participate materially in a coalition for fear of acceding sovereign rights. Nations can cooperate in this format without sacrificing either autonomy or sovereignty. Each nation could satisfy American and domestic security concerns while retaining an independent voice in world affairs. Finally, coalition military and political leaders will have an easier time justifying this form of cooperation to their constituencies as a necessity of state, exercising their own sovereign rights.

This method of cooperation also recognizes the realities of the world's naval fleets. An overwhelming majority of the world's navies are not blue-water, power projection/sea control navies, but coastal forces with only the capability of operating within range of their homeports, and within their EEZ.^{xxxix} Smaller navies, with smaller ships, could not hope to participate in a naval coalition, in its historical context, with the USN in the global commons of the mid-ocean. Developing a system of MDA sharing cooperation between the individual naval headquarters, likewise, seems much more realistic than fostering interoperability between individual ships. The smaller and less technologically advanced ships of the world cannot hope to be interoperable the USN. In fact, many of our western allies are no longer truly interoperable. One can argue that every navy less the Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, Canadian Forces Maritime Command, and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force fall into this category. By establishing the backbone of the global fleet, a cooperative virtual MDA, between the national naval headquarters, and utilizing an already in place domestic C2 nodes between the headquarters and its fleet, you foster inclusion of these smaller ships into the 1000-Ship Navy. This is an important nuance, when you consider that a vast majority of the world's maritime threats emanate from nations with less developed fleets.

Challenges to cooperation:

As most threats to the free-flow of maritime commerce will emerge from the littorals, the biggest challenges to this type of maritime cooperation is how to address littoral nations that are unwilling or unable to exercise their sovereign rights, or formulate even a modicum of awareness within of their own EEZ. Somalia is a prime example: as a legitimately failed state, abreast a major shipping lane at the mouth of the Red Sea, it is not by any definition

capable of exercising maritime sovereignty. Although unable to exercise security functions, some nations, such as Somalia, will nonetheless zealously guard their sovereignty, unwilling to accept outside help.

This scenario calls for a two-pronged approach. For the nations that are unable, the answer is simple. The US, in concert with regional partners must dedicate resources in increasing the maritime nation's capacity to exercise its own sovereignty. For the USN this is likely to take the form of any manner of Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) actions. Some in the government have already called for the procurement of large numbers of low-cost patrol vessels to provide pro-bono to needy nations. For the regional partners this activity would logically be in the form of a training and exercise program, as well as information sharing to build capacity. Training and exercise programs sponsored by a nation's regional partners, vice the US, sometimes do not initiate sovereignty concerns, simply because they are not American.

The second genre of non-participating nation, a nation unwilling to exercise its own sovereignty, is a much more difficult scenario in this type of maritime cooperation. If the sovereign is unwilling, it is clear that its military, border control mechanisms, and domestic maritime authorities will not be part of the global fleet. While not optimal, it would seem that the only local means of securing the international sea-lanes along a unwilling nations coastline is either a US unilateral action, or a coalition of regional partners operating inside the unwilling nation's EEZ. Each of these scenarios would raise significant sovereignty infringement concerns with our allies. However, these actions would appear to be principled under international maritime law, as an appropriate action when a nation is unwilling to exercise its sovereignty. Obviously, a UN mandate would alleviate some of the regional

concerns. In any scenario, it appears certain that the level of maritime awareness will suffer within an unwilling nation's EEZ.

Realizing the 1000-Ship Navy:

To foster the level of naval cooperation required to realize the 1000-Ship Navy the impetus for reorganization must come from within the USN. Other than the IMO, the USN is the only maritime organization with global reach, and certainly the only organization with the political and economic resources required for this significant endeavor. The USN, specifically the Naval Component Commanders, should use their considerable influence among partner nations and navies to form a coalition of the willing. While the term "coalition of the willing" is used in this context, it could aptly be described as cooperation of the willing. Under this premise of realizing the 1000-Ship Navy, America would enter into a series of bi-lateral agreements with maritime nations built upon the frameworks of established regional organizations, and the geographic Naval Component Commander's TSCP plans.

The 1000-Ship Navy can only become a reality if all parties agree that it will generate enhanced security and safety of their nation. Consequently, one basic requirement for the successful implementation of such a concept is that the economic interest of America be deemphasized in favor of the overall gain. Crucial to cooperation is a common understanding of the importance of a free sea to the well being of not only ourselves, but of our allies.

There are substantial challenges to this form of multi-national naval cooperation, not the least of which will be the establishment of the technical means of disseminating the

virtual MDA across the coalition. The effectiveness of the 1000-Ship Navy depends almost entirely on the speed and fidelity of the information being shared.

In conclusion, in order to realize the Admiral Mullen's goal of establishing a global fleet, or a 1000-Ship Navy, the service must abandon paradigms 225 years in the making. We were able to rely upon the old formulas for naval cooperation through a function of economics and geo-politics. Both factors have changed dramatically in recent years. For the service's first 175 years, our traditional notion of maritime cooperation worked because we possessed enjoyed the enviable position of having great strategic depth created by both the oceans and our insular economy. We were able to participate, or not participate, in maritime security coalitions based upon our national interest of the day. During the Cold War, and the advent of a globalized economy, this mechanism of coalition building continued work due to the nature of bi-polar geopolitics. Our allies, and their populous would accede some national sovereignty as the lesser of two evils; be complicit with the US, or exist outside our defense umbrella. Since the end of the Cold War, while our need to maintain global maritime security has dramatically increased, our political leverage to operate in the traditional manner has withered. No longer will foreign capitals join in our military adventurism simply out of loyalty to Washington. Given current geopolitics, it appears that the only reasonable means to realize the 1000-Ship Navy and global maritime security is to abandon our old notions of coalition building, in favor of a new paradigm of cooperation building.

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- ⁱ U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Quotes from the CNO” <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=11&c=6>, (accessed 29 September 2006).
- ⁱⁱ John Nathman, “In Harm’s Way: Naval Aviation at the Dawn of the 21st Century,” <http://www.tailhook.org/BrfFa00.htm>, (accessed 17 October 2006).
- ⁱⁱⁱ Lynn E. Davis, *Globilization’s Security Implications*, RAND Issue Paper, (Arlington, VA.: RAND, 2004), 7.
- ^{iv} Australian Politics.com, “The World’s Largest Economies,” http://www.australianpolitics.com/foreign/trade/03-01-07_largest-economies.shtml (accessed 20 October 2006).
- ^v U.S. President. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington, DC: White House, 2002), 17.
- ^{vi} John G. Morgan and Charles W. Martoglio, “The 1000-Ship Navy-Global Maritime Network,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 2005, 15-17.
- ^{vii} U.S. Navy. Chief of Information, Quotes from the CNO.
- ^{viii} Sir Julian Corbett published his seminal work *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* in 1911. His concept of naval strategy stood in counter-point to the dominant naval theorist of the period, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN. Corbett’s most significant departure from Mahanian theory was his rejection of the idea that decisive battle was the paramount means to achieve control of the sea and to secure the sea lanes of communication. Corbett proposed that the primary goal of maritime nation’s naval force was the protection of its merchant fleet and lines of communication.
- ^{ix} U.S. Navy. Navy Historical Center, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1945-1950,” <http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm#1945>, (accessed 15 September 2006).
- ^x U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Status of the Navy as of 29 September,” 2006 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy.asp?id=146, (accessed 29 September 2006).
- ^{xi} Program on International Policy Attitudes, “U.S. Budget: The Public’s Priorities,” http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php?pnt=85 (accessed 15 September 2006).
- ^{xii} U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of the Naval Operations, “Speeches” <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen060519-kqv.txt> , (accessed 29 September 2006).
- ^{xiii} Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN and Sir Julian Corbett were the two dominant naval theorists of the 20th century, and their ideas are considered the foundations of modern naval theory. Captain Mahan’s most famous work, *The Influence of Seapower upon History* was the foundation upon which the USN developed its “battleship mentality.” Mahan’s thesis was

that commerce was fundamental to maritime power, and that the best way to threaten and/or defend it was to engage the enemy's most powerful forces in decisive battle. Corbett, the author of *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* agreed with Mahan on the importance of sea-power and its relation of commerce. Corbett, however, rejected the idea that decisive battle was the paramount means to achieve control of the sea. Unlike Mahan, he favored the construction of fleets especially adapted to controlling commerce, and not to inter-fleet combat. Additionally, Corbett, unlike Mahan did not view maritime power as decisive in conflict. Corbett argued that the role of sea-power was to effect things ashore through the control of commerce.

^{xiv} Thomas P. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map." *Esquire*, March 2003, 176.

^{xv} Battleship mentality is a term coined to summarize the maritime theories of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan who proposed that the best way to threaten and/or defend lines of communication was to engage the enemy's fleet in decisive battle. He proposed that the navies should build fleets optimized for fleet versus fleet combat. Originally, the term "battleship mentality" was used to indicate a theoretical allegiance to the battleship, the most powerful warship of the day. While the USN has long since transitioned away from the battleship, pundits would argue that the fleet's modern Carriers and Submarines have replaced the Battleship as the centerpiece of modern battleship mentality.

^{xvi} U.S. President. The National Strategy for Maritime Security. (Washington, DC: White House, 2005), 16.

^{xvii} Keith Bradsher, "North Korean Ploy Masks Ships Under Other Flags," *New York Times*, 20 October 2006, 14.

^{xviii} Global Security, "Regional Maritime Security Initiative," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rmsi.htm> (accessed 12 September 2006).

^{xix} International Maritime Organization, *International Shipping Facts and Figures*, (London: IMO, 2006), 1.

^{xx} *The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878* (18 USC 1385) is a reconstruction era law prohibiting the use of Army (and by extension the Air force) in enforcing domestic laws except where expressly authorized by Constitution or Congress. This law was extended to the Navy and Marine Corps by DOD regulation in 1981.

^{xxi} Autoridad Canal de Panama, "Así es el Canal," <http://www.pancanal.com/esp/general/asi-es-el-canal.html> (accessed 03 October 2006).

^{xxii} Servicio Marítimo Nacional, "Funciones Específicas," <http://www.smn.gob.pa/funciones.htm> (accessed 15 October 2006). Constitutionally prohibited from possessing military forces, the Government of Panama has established a small para-military force, the Servicio Marítimo Nacional (SMN), to act as a maritime border guard and security force. The SMN has land and air counterparts within the Panamanian Government.

^{xxiii} U.S. President, The National Strategy For Maritime Security, 13.

^{xxiv} U.S. President, The National Strategy For Maritime Security, 3.

^{xxv} Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, 98.

^{xxvi} Joint Interagency Task Force-South, “J-5 Mission Statement,” <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/> (accessed 17 October 2006). Joint Interagency Task Force South conducts counter-illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic. The militaries of the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, France, and Colombia have loose intelligence/asset sharing agreements with JIATF-S. Other nations may also act in concert with JIATF-S on an ad-hoc basis.

^{xxvii} Robert H. Thomas, *Multinational Naval Cooperation*, Maritime Security Occasional Paper Number 3, (Halifax, NS: Center for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University, 1996), 2.

^{xxviii} Steven Metz, “America in the Third World,” Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=338> (accessed 01 October, 2006).

^{xxix} Joshua Ho, “Operationalising the Regional Maritime Security Initiative,” Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, <http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/Perspective/IDSS182004.pdf> (accessed 28 September 2006).

^{xxx} Sumathy Permal, “Piracy and Sovereignty in the Strait of Malacca,” Maritime Institute of Malaysia, <http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/sumathy/som-piracy.pdf> (accessed 13 October, 2006).

^{xxxi} U.S. Pacific Command, “Remarks at the 4th annual Shangri-La Dialogue – Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation,” <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050606-emi-shangrila.shtml> (accessed 22 October 2006).

^{xxxii} American Society of International Law, “United States: Policy of Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” <http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/courses/admin-perritt/pdd-25.html> (accessed 10 September 2006).

^{xxxiii} Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication (JP) 1, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 14 November 2000), V-7.

^{xxxiv} U.S. President, The National Strategy For Maritime Security, 1.

^{xxxv} Robert H. Thomas, *Multinational Naval Cooperation*, 3.

^{xxxvi} Furthermore, the Convention gives enforcement powers to the State where a ship is destined for. The port State can enforce any type of international rule (enforcement of treaty obligations dealing with shipping standards, marine safety and pollution prevention, etc) or national regulations adopted in accordance with UNCLOS or applicable international rules as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their offshore terminals.

^{xxxvii} David I Ledson, “The Commanders Respond,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 2006, 44.

^{xxxviii} Marina Militare, “Progetto Pilota per l’istituzione del Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre,” <http://www.marina.difesa.it/vrmtc/it/vrmtc.htm> (accessed 02 October 2006).

^{xxxix} Luis Pons, *El Valor de los Patrulleros en la Guerra Contra el Terrorismo*, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Insituto Universitario Naval Unidad Academica Escuela de Guerra Naval, 2006), 35.